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Monarchical Suppression of the Legislature in Morocco post–Alternance
—Trevor Mauck (Edited by Skye MacKay)
Morocco is a small North African country, uniquely located on the periphery of the Middle Eastern and
European worlds. Influences from the two distinct cultures can be seen throughout Morocco in the country’s
dress, language, cuisine, and evolving political structure. Before colonization by the French, the area that now
constitutes Morocco was ruled by sultanates and dynasties. Since gaining its independence in 1956, Morocco
has been ruled by a hereditary monarchy (1).
In 1996 Morocco took an important step toward
establishing a democracy: a bicameral legislature was
formed and the first opposition government sworn in.
This step established a Westminster–based
parliamentary system, where the majority party(ies)
forms the government and the minority party(ies)
forms the opposition. More civil liberties, greater
status for women and less religious control resulted
from this new government, called the gouvernement
d’alternance, the government of change. However,
questions remained about how much real power the
legislature and opposition voices had under the
monarchy and about the future of civil reforms.
My interest in these questions was twofold: First,
Americans take for granted the complexity of a
functioning liberal democracy, so I wanted to look
into the challenges that a country like Morocco faces,
such as an undefined distinction between church and
state and a weak separation between the branches of
Morocco and its major cities
government. Second, I wanted to study the dynamics
between a legislature and a monarchy, two institutions with seemingly opposing natures. After extensive
background research at the University of New Hampshire, I traveled to Morocco in the summer of 2007. Based
at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane (near Fès), I read reports and studies in its Mohammed VI Library, spoke
with local Moroccan scholars, and traveled throughout the country to get a sense of how the people feel
about the current political structure. One of the greatest barriers to my research was language. In the rural
areas many of the people spoke only Arabic, but in the urban areas I could communicate with people in
French, the language of government and business.

Moving toward Democracy?
The Moroccan constitution, which outlines the country’s political structure, was first adopted in 1962 and later
ratified in 1970, 1972 and 1992. Each successive rendition of the Constitution reaffirmed the monarchy’s
preeminence and subordinate roles for the other branches of government (2). Article 1 states that Morocco
“shall have a democratic, social and constitutional monarchy.” Opponents of the monarchy feel this has not
happened and, after the elections of 1993, refused to take part in the government.

Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane

In 1996 King Hassan II pushed through referendums
amending the Moroccan Constitution to create a second
chamber for the country’s parliament and to give greater
power to the parliamentary members. This move by the king
was met with a variety of opinions. Many supporters
heralded the referendums as another step in Morocco’s
emerging democracy; others saw them as a move to appease
and weaken the opposition, who had become noticeably
stronger and more organized (3). Nevertheless, the changes
went through, and in 1997 the opposition parties decided to
take part again in parliamentary elections. As a result, the
gouvernement d’alternance took effect in what was deemed
the first experiment in the Arab world in directly electing an
opposition party.

Ten years later, however, in the wake of the September 2007 parliamentary elections, the gouvernement
d’alternance has been unsuccessful in delivering on its commitment to form a liberal democracy, that is, a
democracy that demonstrates the rule of law, universal suffrage, regular elections that are free and fair, and
vertical and horizontal accountability (4). Instead, the role of the opposition parties in a state dominated by
the chief executive (king) has remained ill–defined.

A Political Structure Designed to Favor the Monarchy
The Moroccan government is headed by a prime minister assisted by a cabinet of ministers, all of whom are
appointed by the king independent of election results. The legislative branch is composed of a bicameral
Parliament (Articles 36–38). The two chambers of the Parliament are the Assembly of Representatives, whose
325 members are elected through direct universal suffrage for five–year terms; and the Assembly of
Councilors, whose 270 members are indirectly elected through two electoral colleges for nine–year
terms. Lastly, the independent judicial branch is composed of judges who are appointed by the king upon
recommendation from the Higher Judiciary Council (Article 82).
The governmental structure has all the elements of a democracy; however, ultimate power rests with the king
alone. The little power the branches of government do have comes from him. The Constitution affords the
king power to appoint and remove from office any minister (Article 24), dissolve the Parliament (Article 27),
revise the Constitution (Article 103), and rule by royal decree (Article 29). The king, not the government, has
control over the ministries of defense, foreign affairs and the interior. He is the country's “most important
farmer, biggest banker and most active venture capitalist” (5). In essence, the Constitution establishes a
government that acts as an instrument of the royal will.

The Moroccan political structure is similar to other seeming democracies, products of the third–wave of
democratization, a movement in the late 1980s inspired by the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent
international praise for democratic ideas (6). Countries like Morocco started democratization backwards,
introducing free elections before establishing formal institutions for a civil society such as the rule of law.
From the outside, therefore, Morocco appears democratic, when in reality it is not. In fact, much of the
authoritarian structure developed by the late King Hassan II remains in place today. Morocco has been very
successful in creating a democratic façade that has allowed them to receive continued support from the
West. Despite the notable array of institutions that appear democratic—a bicameral legislature, a multiparty
electoral competition and a government composed mainly of opposition party members—“no significant
power has devolved outside the regime” (3). For that reason, Morocco has been categorized as a “pseudo–
democracy,” a governmental system that combines moderate civil liberties with political authoritarianism (3).

Depoliticization and Suppression
Article 3 of the Constitution establishes a multi–party system: “[p]olitical parties, unions, district councils and
trade chambers shall participate in the organization and representation of the citizens. There shall be no one–
party system.” Again, the wording does not guarantee the political parties or the legislative branch any real
power. In reality, the regime has actively weakened and repressed opposition through a variety of methods,
including banning, imprisonment, threats, torture, and in rare cases, assassination of their leaders.
The monarchy has sought to “swell and fragment” the opposition by creating rivalry and tension within the
parties (7). This has resulted in the creation of more parties with similar ideological backgrounds vying for the
same power. As of 2007, Morocco had more than forty political parties, twenty–six of which participated in
the 2002 elections. Amid the fragmented parties, political discourse tends to focus on trivial issues rather than
on demanding accountability from the monarchy and questioning the uneven power distribution (8). This
fragmentation creates a political atmosphere that is not conducive to building opposition movements.
In the post–alternance era, King Mohammed VI has sought to distract political attention from domestic affairs
by citing Morocco’s new commitment to the free trade alliance with Europe. Domestic issues that have
previously fueled the opposition such as the stagnant economy, rampant unemployment, widespread poverty,
political corruption and human rights abuses have received insufficient attention. Instead, questions
regarding domestic issues and political legitimacy have been revamped in purely economic terms. It is as
though the monarchy has the entire population convinced that all political problems have economic
solutions. Consequently, “parties that might have spearheaded democratic reform have meanwhile diluted
their demands and embraced the monarchy's claim that the country simply needs better economic
management” (9).
Morocco has also witnessed a series of passive and assertive forms of political suppression by the
monarchy. The first form is designed to lure opposition members into positions supportive of the government
by either offering them esteemed, though impotent, positions or handing out material benefits, both designed
to moderate or convert outspoken individuals. In this way several senior members of opposition parties have
joined the palace. Passive measures also include monarchical encroachment on the base of support of a party
or organization. For example, to counter the support of the Islamic community for the Party of Justice and
Development (PJD), the regime has invested heavily in the religious sphere as a means of encroachment. The
king, as both the religious and political leader of the country, is deeply concerned with maintaining religious as
well as political authority. In 2006 fifteen new mosques were constructed by the palace, including the
Mohammed VI mosque in the eastern city of Oujda (10). Using the new mosques as instruments of community
outreach, the monarchy has sought to ingratiate itself with the Islamic community and thereby undermine the
PJD’s political foundation.

Assertive suppression by the palace comes in the
form of punishments inflicted on parties,
organizations or individuals who are “perceived
to be overly critical [of] or even insufficiently
cooperative” with the government (8). One
example is the monarchy’s exclusion from politics
of the group Al–Adl wa Ihsan (Justice and
Charity). This group’s spiritual founder and
leader, Abdeslam Yassine, has openly criticized
the political and religious authority of the king.
Retribution from the regime was a political ban
on him personally and his organization in its
entirety.
These two forms of political suppression have had
their effect on the people at large. Throughout
my travels I encountered individuals who
dismissed politics as a process removed from
them—a process that was for people other than
themselves. The level of apathy is dangerously
high, which has further allowed the status quo to
remain uncontested. The 2007 parliamentary
elections saw the lowest voter turnout in
Morocco’s history with only 37% of the electorate
participating.
The author in the 17th–century palace of King Moulay Ismail in Meknes

Arguments in Support of a Weak Opposition
It is important to note that monarchical rationalization for the suppression of opposition parties is not entirely
centered on unjustified supremacy. There are two major arguments for why a weak opposition is necessary in
Morocco’s political evolution.
The first is based on the fear that unregulated opposition parties may culminate in something resembling the
“Algerian crisis” of 1991, where the Islamic Salvation Front Party (FIS) won a democratic majority, capturing
188 of the 430 seats in the first round. Five days before the second round of elections were to take place, the
army intervened, cancelled the elections and set up a de facto government. This led to armed clashes between
the FIS and the High State Committee. From the end of 1991 to 1993 thousands of lives were lost due to this
fighting. Morocco has a geographical and ideological proximity to Algeria and fears a similar situation (11).
The second argument is that emerging democracies cannot have an overbearing opposition because such
opposition could polarize the populace along socioeconomic lines. This is especially the case when the country
needs unity, not competition, to strengthen its nascent democratic foundation. However, neither argument is
valid in the case of Morocco.
Possible disastrous consequences of unregulated opposition parties, the first argument, are further supported
by fear of political Islam, a threat prevalent in Morocco and the greater Muslim world. Fundamental Islamic
movements, it is feared, employ democracy only as a means of achieving power; once in power, the

democratic institutions are systematically dissolved. This creates a political process that has been called “one
man, one vote, once” (12). The reality of this problem is not in line with the Moroccan political structure.
Unlike neighboring Algeria, Morocco has a relatively mature and well–defined state with an executive who has
the power and the ability to maintain order.
The second argument for a weak opposition holds that a multiplicity of parties politicizes existing social
cleavages and thus breeds disunity (13). Supporting this argument are examples of single party systems that
have responsibly and successfully governed their respective countries. Leaders such as Julius Kambarage
Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth David Kaunda in Zambia and Felix Houphouet–Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire each
maintained a single party system (13). Each man was the first leader in his respective country and set up a
one–party system to raise his country from political turmoil.
Although some form of effective government resulted in each case, more relevant is the fact that none of the
three countries has yet developed into a functioning liberal democracy nor are they positioned to do so in the
foreseeable future. Morocco is not a new nation emerging from chaos; political stability and a strong sense of
national unity already exist. What Morocco actually needs to further its democratic evolution is the
development of democratic institutions, like strong opposition parties.

Civil Society Reforms and the Future
The current king, Mohammed VI, while retaining political power, has brought about significant reforms in the
civil society of his country. He has not followed the despotic tactics of his father’s era and has welcomed the
return of political antagonists who were previously exiled or silenced. He also recognized and, through the
Equity and Reconciliation Commission, sought to compensate victims and their families who had been
subjected to an array of human rights violations. In addition, the young king established Morocco as a leader
in the Arab world in terms of gender equality by liberalizing Moroccan family law (Moudawana), thereby
granting women previously unknown rights and freedoms. In 2005, the monarchy set up an independent
organization to investigate and combat corruption. Most notable among the resulting reforms was the
expeditious removal of Driss Basri, who, during his twenty years as Interior Minister, became the poster–child
of anti–democracy and repression within the regime through his ruthless tactics of election rigging and
regime–loyalist favoritism (9).
Under the new king there has been a relaxation of political and civil control. There is now greater tolerance of
dissent and more room for political organizations to operate. This has led to the creation of many
organizations and associations that were previously banned such as human rights groups, women’s
associations, cultural movements, and youth groups. These organizations have not yet reached maturity, so
their potential to effect change is still unknown. Yet their future will undoubtedly shape the direction of the
country and perhaps present a real challenge to the king’s monopoly on power.
During my time in Morocco the liberalization of civil society was clearly on display. The Morocco that I read
about under King Hassan II was wholly distinct from the Morocco that I witnessed in my travels, particularly in
the new roles for women. Many of the urban centers could be mistaken for European cities, where women are
free to act and dress as they wish. The most recent elections (2007) saw more women elected to the federal
legislature than ever before. More women are entering the job market and attending universities. At Al
Akhawayn University, just over 50% of the enrollment was female (14). All of these advancements are
promising, and they will, it is hoped, continue to influence the direction of the country.

Morocco, however, remains a monarchical state with much of the authoritarian apparatus set up under King
Hassan II still in place. The original optimism surrounding the gouvernement d’alternance has largely
dissipated, and many of its promises have gone unfulfilled. What remains is a compromised federal legislature
that presents little opposition to the monarchy. Nevertheless, the civil reforms of the last ten years can
potentially provide the basis for a legitimate democratic transformation. Despite the king’s commitment to a
weak legislative body, it is possible that he may be contested by the political associations and organizations
that have arisen in the now more open civil society.
The author would like to thank Dr. Jeannie Sowers (UNH) and Dr. Audra Grant (AUI) for their support and
guidance throughout. Thanks is also owed to the Student Undergraduate Research Fellowships program at the
University of New Hampshire for the generous research travel grant to Morocco during the summer of 2007. In
addition, the author recognizes his indebtedness to Al Akhawayn University and the friendly people of Morocco
who number too many to mention individually.
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